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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the concepts of peacebuilding, transitional justice and reconciliation each share the 
common goal of seeking to identify how war-torn societies can transition towards lasting 
peace, they have distinct origins, mechanisms and rationales. As a result, from the 1990s, 
amnesty laws to shield offenders from legal sanctions have been at the epicentre of clashes 
between these different approaches. For example, the growth of transitional justice was 
strongly influenced by international human rights law and international legal scholars and 
jurists.
2
 This meant that transitional justice programmes were often highly legalistic and 
aimed as far as possible to deliver prosecutions for serious violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law. This contrasted with peacebuilding or conflict resolution 
strategies that sought to develop bespoke, more political solutions to tackle the problems 
faced by war-torn States, or with reconciliation programmes that for well-intentioned or 
nefarious reasons often emphasised the importance of forgiving and forgetting in rebuilding 
post-conflict States through the use of amnesty laws or other leniency measures. However, in 
recent years, the development of an international consensus on the importance of (re)-
establishing the rule of law in post-conflict States has contributed to a growing convergence 
between the concepts of peacebuilding, transitional justice and reconciliation on the 
permissibility of amnesty laws. As a result, contemporary amnesty laws are often the most 
contentious aspect of peacebuilding and reconciliation programmes. This controversy has 
been recognized in the EU-sponsored project on Armed Conflicts, Peacekeeping, Transitional 
Justice: Law as Solution (ATLAS), which has produced this edited collection. In its aims and 
goals, this project is required inter alia to ‗[d]etermine how amnesties, impunities and 
criminal justice contribute to post-conflict national reconciliation‘ and to ‗[a]nalyse if they 
are antagonistic or if they can be reconciled in a manner that satisfies the requirements of 
international human rights law and the rule of law‘.3 This paper will focus on the latter of 
these questions. 
This analysis will begin by exploring the scope and effects of amnesty laws in order 
to highlight the considerable diversity among contemporary amnesties. This discussion will 
provide the basis for the arguments in this paper that limited, individualised and conditional 
forms of amnesty do not automatically result in impunity, but instead can potentially impact 
positively upon national reconciliation and the rule of law in post-conflict States. The 
following section will focus on the ambiguous concept of the rule of law by highlighting its 
core elements and exploring why it has such appeal for post-conflict States and international 
actors. The chapter will then address the relationship between amnesty programmes and the 
elements of the rule of law with which they most frequently conflict, namely adhering to 
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domestic legal rules on the use of amnesty including the principles of legality and equality, 
enforcing international legal obligations, and ending impunity. In keeping with the ATLAS 
project objectives, the paper will conclude by offering some recommendations for the 
European Union (EU) in approaching human rights and international humanitarian law in 
post-conflict States. 
II. DEFINING AMNESTIES 
Amnesty laws have long been used by political leaders to promote peace and reconciliation in 
response to armed conflict. This history can be charted back to one of the earliest known 
peace agreements concluded between Rameses II of Egypt and Hatusiliš III of the Hittites in 
1258 BCE. During the intervening centuries, amnesties featured in numerous peace 
agreements concluded following armed conflicts between States.
4
 Amnesties have also long 
been granted within States by sovereigns to subjects who breached what were then perceived 
as the monarch‘s laws.5 Such amnesties were often portrayed as acts of forgiveness or mercy 
emanating from the monarch towards wayward subjects, including those who had taken up 
arms against their ruler.
6
 Although the growth of transitional justice and international 
criminal law has caused the use of amnesty laws to become increasingly controversial, 
particularly from the late 1990s, amnesties continue to be frequently used in response to 
violent conflict. For example, according to the Amnesty Law Database compiled by the 
author,
7
 almost half of 389 amnesties laws enacted in 117 countries during the past 30 years 
related to conflicts, either when the conflict was still ongoing or as a result of peace 
negotiations.
8
 Similar findings have been reached by comparative large-N studies on peace 
agreements. Furthermore, in a survey of peace agreements made between 1980 and 2006, 
Vinjamuri and Boesenecker found that whilst ‗provisions for prosecutions and truth 
commissions are rare in peace agreements … the use of amnesty is comparatively common‘.9 
In addition, they found that the rates of amnesties in the agreements remained ‗relatively 
stable over the time period analysed‘,10 even though from 2000, the number of peace 
agreements concluded declined.
11
 
Despite their long history and continued widespread use, there is a lack of conceptual 
clarity on the nature of amnesty laws. This arises for several reasons. Firstly, within national 
legal systems, the term ‗amnesty‘ may be defined differently and different bodies may be 
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empowered to grant amnesties.
12
 This can be particularly problematic where domestic law 
does not clearly distinguish between amnesties and pardons.
13
 Secondly, as amnesty laws 
have traditionally fallen within the domain of State sovereignty, no accepted international 
definition of amnesty laws has developed. As a result, the scope and effect of amnesty laws 
around the world can look very different, ranging from amnesty laws to provide a form of 
reparations to persons who have been arbitrarily detained by a repressive State to self-
amnesty laws enacted by dictatorial rulers or war criminals eager to avoid penal sanctions. 
Indeed, Mark Freeman has suggested that ‗the difference between certain amnesties is so 
vast… that it is almost nonsensical to compare them‘.14 However, in general, amnesty laws 
can be understood as legal tools deployed by governments to remove criminal and/or civil 
sanctions from specified categories of offenders or offences. 
In some post-conflict contexts, distinctions between amnesties and other leniency 
measures, such as plea agreements or use immunity, become blurred, particularly where 
amnesty is offered in exchange for testimony or participation in an alternative justice 
process.
15
 Many alternative forms of leniency have similar outcomes to amnesty laws, but as 
yet do not attract the same international opprobrium and some such as plea bargains are an 
accepted part of the criminal procedures of international tribunals and some national legal 
systems.
16
 
As amnesties are designed to bar to prosecutions, they are often described as being 
‗beyond the courts‘. However, in practice their relationship to judicial institutions is much 
more complex. For example, where amnesty laws are proposed or enacted their legality may 
be challenged before constitutional courts or before international human rights monitoring 
bodies. Furthermore, if an amnesty is enacted, domestic courts may be involved in 
implementing it where they are empowered to determine if the amnesty can be applied to an 
individual case to foreclose prosecution or punishment. This power to determine the 
applicability of amnesty recognizes that often prosecutions remain possible even where 
amnesties are enacted. Indeed, in many amnesty processes, the possibility of prosecutions is 
written into the text through the limiting of amnesty to an exhaustive list of crimes or 
offenders, or through the exclusion of specified crimes, offenders or crimes committed 
outside specified dates. Alternatively, where an amnesty is conditional on individual 
offenders performing or refraining from specific actions, prosecutions could be pursued for 
those who do not fulfil the amnesties‘ conditions. Such limited amnesty laws are intended to 
complement some trials, whilst simultaneously preventing prosecutions in other cases. 
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Domestic courts can also exercise jurisdiction over amnesty processes where they are 
empowered to review the decisions of administrative amnesty-granting bodies. Finally, 
domestic courts or international or hybrid courts may face the decision whether to disregard 
or reinterpret pre-existing amnesty laws in light of developments in international law. This 
demonstrates that rather than being ‗beyond the courts‘, amnesties are a product of the law 
and are often regulated by judicial mechanisms. As a result, the relationship between amnesty 
laws and the rule of law is a complex question that will often depend on the parameters of the 
amnesty and its relationship to accountability mechanisms. 
III. THE RULE OF LAW‘S ALLURE IN POST-CONFLICT STATES 
As is frequently acknowledged, the rule of law is ‗an exceedingly elusive notion‘17 that is 
subject to much ‗confusion ... about its meaning and scope among scholars and practitioners 
alike‘.18 However, from ancient times, the concept has been understood as a bulwark against 
tyranny, as a shield of the citizen against arbitrary and unequal exercises of power by 
unaccountable rulers.
19
 Consequently, societies governed by the rule of law are places where 
the law is predictable and equally enforced. The exact components of the rule of law within 
democratic States have long been subject to scholarly debate; however, some elements are 
widely accepted. For example, the rule of law denotes a system in which ‗laws are public 
knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply to everyone‘; where the ‗central institutions of 
the legal system, including courts, prosecutors and the police, are reasonably fair, competent 
and efficient‘, and the judiciary are ‗impartial and independent, not subject to political 
influence or manipulation‘, and in which the executive abides by the national laws and public 
servants are held accountable for their actions.
20
 Furthermore, the rule of law requires 
adherence to the principles of ‗supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency‘.21 
Since the 1990s, the rule of law has been seen ‗as the panacea for all the problems that 
afflict many non-Western countries, particularly in post-conflict settings‘.22 The attraction of 
the rule of law in the aftermath of war is manifold. For example, conflicts typically corrode 
the rule of law through processes such as the introduction of repressive laws or the 
abandonment or collapse of formal legal systems.
23
 As a result, peacebuilding processes often 
entail re-establishing these damaged institutions and repealing unjust laws. Furthermore, 
where the law is politicised during conflicts, rebuilding it during peacetime may represent ‗a 
desire to escape from politics by imagining the rule of law as technical, legal, and 
apolitical‘.24 This approach is based on claims that the rule of law ‗speaks to values and 
working practices such as justice, objectivity, certainty, uniformity, universality, rationality 
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and so on‘, which McEvoy argues are ‗particularly prized in times of transition‘.25 However, 
as Teitel has explored, in periods of radical political change and legal instability, the rule of 
law is rarely politically neutral. Instead, it may serve ‗to mediate the normative shift in 
values‘ in which the transitional State‘s legal, economic and political systems are 
transformed.
26
 In such contexts, even enforcing individual rights may represent a dramatic 
break from the former regime.
27
 Whether such dramatic changes benefit who those suffered 
most during the conflict will of course depend on many factors, particularly since the law has 
a tendency to reinforce the power of dominant social forces, usually at the expense of 
marginalised groups, such as women, minorities or the economically deprived.
28
 
Where the lawlessness of conflict resulted in mass human rights abuses, the rule of 
law is often advocated by human rights activists as a deterrent of future abuse, through the 
punishment of perpetrators, the introduction of greater accountability mechanisms, and the 
public communication of norms and values of the respect for the rule of law. In addition, 
where rule of law abuses were part of the root causes of the conflict, efforts to re-establish the 
rule of law may help tackle these underlying structural problems and prevent the conflict‘s re-
emergence. However, as Bell notes, in fragile political transitions ‗normative requirements 
relating to implementing the rule of law must be tempered by the political preconditions of a 
ceasefire necessary to implementing anything at all‘.29 In other words, deviations from the 
rule of law, such as amnesty laws, may initially be needed in order to get to a situation where 
conditions permit the institutional reforms necessary to re-establish the rule of law. 
Proponents of the rule of law also argue that where programmes make government 
officials more accountable and reform the institutions that implement and enforce the law, 
they have the potential ‗to publicly demonstrate a newfound legitimacy and accountability‘.30 
This can enhance ‗people‘s faith in state authority‘.31 However, as Brooks cautions, in order 
to achieve this rule of law programmes must be culturally embedded, rather than externally 
imposed.
32
 Finally, for development experts and economists, the rule of law offers the 
potential for economic development and prosperity, which will enhance ‗the long-term 
viability of the state‘.33 
Drawing on these diverse hoped-for outcomes, rule of law peacebuilding programmes 
today often encompass an array of measures including writing new constitutions, passing new 
laws, and implementing international human rights standards; reforming the judiciary, 
improving court facilities and training judges and lawyers; reforming and training the police 
and prison services; improving the transparency and accountability of government 
institutions; and educating the public on their legal rights and strengthening local 
participation in governance.
34
 Such rule of law programmes have gained considerable 
international financial backing in peacebuilding programmes around the world, and in cases 
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like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, they have contributed to conditions where 
prosecutions of human rights violators before national courts are possible. For transitional 
justice activists, such prosecutions are the main goal of rule of law programmes, and 
consequently, where amnesties block prosecutions they are seen to represent an obstacle to 
the rule of law. As amnesties do not directly block wider rule of law programmes, this 
chapter will focus on where amnesties may potentially come into conflict with the rule of law 
and criminal justice, namely ensuring equality before the law, adhering to domestic legal 
rules on the use of amnesty, enforcing international legal obligations, and ending impunity. 
This analysis is starting from the assumption articulated by the United Nations (UN) 
Secretary-General in his 2004 influential report on Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law 
in which he stated that ‗[i]n the end, in post-conflict countries, the vast majority of 
perpetrators of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law will 
never be tried, whether internationally or domestically‘.35 This indicates that any post-conflict 
prosecution strategy will be selective, and that as a result, weighing up the merits or 
disadvantages of amnesty should also entail considering the impact of selective prosecutions. 
In particular, this analysis should consider whether the rule of law is better served by bringing 
those combatants or offenders who are beyond the reach of limited prosecutions into a 
broader peacebuilding and reconciliation programme. 
IV. DOMESTIC RULES ON AMNESTY ENACTMENT 
All legal systems provide for some of leniency within their criminal justice processes, as a 
result, where post-conflict States wish to enact amnesty legislation, their scope for discretion 
may be constrained by domestic law. For example, domestic constitutions often provide rules 
that govern the enactment of amnesty laws. These rules can stipulate whether the executive, 
or legislature, or both are empowered to grant amnesty,
36
 which crimes amnesty can be 
granted for, and whether amnesty can be granted to individuals who have yet to be convicted. 
Furthermore, as national legislation, amnesty laws generally have comply with the normal 
legislative procedures. Simple adherence to such domestic rules generally represents a 
‗minimal rule of law‘,37 that is concerned with whether the law is enacted in accordance with 
the correct procedures, as opposed to broader ideas of the rule of law which consider whether 
it is morally correct to enact an amnesty law. 
For an amnesty to be considered legally valid under domestic law, at a minimum, its 
enactment process must adhere to these formal rules. Where the formal rules are not 
respected, national courts may be empowered to declare the amnesty law unconstitutional. 
This could occur, for example, where a military government proclaims a self-amnesty in 
violation of domestic legal requirements that amnesties be legislated by parliament. In such 
cases, depending on domestic rules, the courts may declare the amnesty void or require the 
executive to amend the legislation so that it conforms to the appropriate standards.
38
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Alternatively, the government‘s decision may be subject to judicial review proceedings 
before domestic administrative courts. 
Adhering to domestic legal rules on the use of amnesties might be beneficial to 
governments in post-conflict States, not just to avoid clashes with the judiciary, but also 
because it might enhance the legitimacy of an amnesty.
39
 This seems particularly likely where 
the amnesty is adopted as part of a public deliberative processes such as public consultations 
or national referenda. Such processes could also trigger public debate on the nature and 
significance of past crimes, in which the violence of the past could be repudiated and the new 
non-violent norms could be communicated. Such public deliberations would serve some of 
the expressivist goals usually ascribed to prosecutions. Indeed, Teitel argues ‗the democratic 
provenance of many of the transitional amnesties can mean that they are frequently more 
transparent and deliberated over than conventional punishment‘.40 
Finally, as noted above, enforcing the rule of law can require lawmakers and the 
judiciary to respect a number of key legal principles. The principles of the most relevance to 
amnesty laws are the principle of legality and the principle of equality. 
A. Principle of Legality 
The principle of legality requires that all laws should be clear, ascertainable and non-
retrospective. Under this principle, a person should only be punished for actions that were 
criminal at the time they were perpetrated and that the offender knew them to be criminal. 
Due to their serious nature, this principle is not thought to apply to international crimes such 
as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; however, arguably it may apply to 
other conflict-related offences. Where the rule of law was compromised during the conflict, 
repressive actions by State forces may be permitted under domestic law, may be encouraged 
through propaganda, and lower-level soldiers may be ordered to perform them by their 
superiors. Such actions could include a range of human rights violations that do not reach the 
threshold of international crimes. Where government agents committed these actions 
believing them to be legal, the principle of legality has been interpreted in some post-conflict 
States to justify granting amnesty for these crimes or excluding such actions from transitional 
justice processes. For example, in South Africa, the government was ‗determined to 
demonstrate its commitment to legality and to the rule of law by avoiding any attempt to 
invalidate the offensive laws of apartheid retrospectively‘.41 As a result, the jurisdiction of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was tailored so that only actions that were criminal 
under apartheid legal system fell within the jurisdiction of the commission.
42
 
B. Equal Protection before the Law 
The principle of equal protection before the law is a core element of the rule of law and is 
enshrined in international human rights law. For example, the Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights (UDHR) proclaims that ‗[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to equal protection of the law‘43 and that 
[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
44
 
Within post-conflict States, efforts to deal with the past can come into conflict with this 
principle where perpetrators of similar crimes are treated differently. This problem can arise 
in most transitional justice processes but it is perhaps most acute in relation to limited 
prosecution strategies or amnesty measures. When developing these processes, legislators or 
prosecutors may be influenced by a number of factors including the numbers of offenders at 
large, the gravity of the crimes, the availability of resources, political constraints or the pre-
existing legal status of the offenders. 
Offenders‘ legal status may be different for State and non-state actors as these groups 
are treated differently under domestic and international human rights law. Under domestic 
laws, members of the armed forces are treated as having a legitimate monopoly on the use of 
force, whereas armed opposition groups are usually prohibited under national law and are 
regarded by the State as criminals to be held accountable. As a result, guerrilla forces may be 
liable for prosecution for engaging in combat whereas State forces could be portrayed as 
upholding, rather than breaching the law. In addition, State forces may have already benefited 
from immunity measures such as indemnity laws. In addition, the legal position of State 
agents and non-state combatants can also be distinguished under international law as although 
international criminal law is viewed as applying to all participants in a conflict,
45
 
international human rights law has traditionally been viewed as having only vertical 
application. This means that to protect citizens from abuses of power by their government, 
international human rights law restricts the actions of States,
46
 and that traditionally, non-state 
actors were not viewed as committing human rights violations. This distinction is evident in 
the Convention Against Torture and the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, as the application of both conventions is restricted to ‗agents of the 
State or ... persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of the State‘.47 However, where such crimes occur during a conflict they could 
be treated as war crimes under international criminal law, which would also make non-state 
actors liable for prosecution. For other crimes, however, post-conflict amnesty and justice 
strategies may have to take into account the existence or absence of liability for different 
categories of offenders. 
In addition to the underlying differences in the legal status of possible amnesty 
beneficiaries, equality issues can also arise when designing the scope of an amnesty, 
particularly since amnesty laws are introduced after the crimes have taken place, and thus 
when they occurred the perpetrators theoretically faced identical fates. For example, under 
the equality principle, criteria such as race, religion, class or other similar classification 
should not be used as a basis on which to pursue prosecutions or grant amnesty.
48
 Observing 
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such distinctions in the wake of an inter-ethnic conflict can be problematic where the post-
conflict State may wish to grant amnesty to combatants who fought in ethically defined 
factions, or where prosecutors may be under pressure to be ‗even-handed‘ when designing 
their prosecution strategies. Similarly, where amnesties are designed to benefit offenders on 
the basis of political allegiances or opinions, which according to Teitel is a ‗permissible 
categorical basis for clemency‘, the demands of equality may result in the scope of the 
amnesty being extended to ensure that it is ‗bipartisan‘.49 Teitel suggests that a bipartisan 
amnesty grant ‗advances the rule of law and legitimacy in the exercise of clemency‘.50 
However, where amnesty laws or prosecution strategies appear to treat all groups equally, it 
can also be problematic as such policies risk creating a ‗myth of equivalency‘ where the 
actions of all parties are seen as equally justified. This is particularly delicate where one party 
to the conflict only committed a small proportion of the crimes, or had only resorted to 
violence in response to severe repression. This was a contentious issue before the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the African National Congress protested the 
commission‘s findings on its culpability for human rights violations by arguing that that 
‗fighting for and against apartheid‘ were not equivalent.51 In general, where the State enacts a 
self-amnesty to benefit its own supports, this is likely to breach the principle of equality. 
Finally, where amnesties are individualized and conditional, the equality principle can 
be a constraining factor in the amnesty granting process. For example, an individualised, 
conditional amnesty can result in perpetrators of similar crimes being treated differently 
depending on how they comply or are deemed to comply with the conditions. Under the 
equality principle, amnesty applicants should not be privileged or discriminated against on 
the grounds of race, religion or ethnicity. However, where the conditions for granting 
amnesty or prosecuting individual offenders are overly subjective, it can result in perpetrators 
of similar crimes being treated inconsistently, even where no discrimination is intended.
52
 
This risks making the process appear arbitrary which could undermine its legitimacy.
53
 The 
risk of inequality can be lessened if the same conditions are applied uniformly to all 
individuals‘ applications, regardless of identity or former affiliation. In addition, where 
amnesties are coupled with selection prosecutions, the criteria used to determine who should 
face trial, or who can be amnestied, such ‗reflect appropriate distinctions based upon degrees 
of culpability‘.54 Orentlicher notes that such distinctions are ‗drawn in every country‘s 
criminal law‘, through sentencing patterns.55 
From the above, it is clear that post-conflict States are required to consider the 
principle of equality during the design and implementation of amnesties or limited 
prosecution strategies. In doing so, they may need to take into account inherent differences in 
the legal status of combatants, and the delicacies of balancing non-discrimination 
requirements with the need to address all communities who were harmed or implicated in the 
violence. In designing the amnesty or justice process, it seems likely that measures targeted 
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only at one group of offenders, such as self-amnesties for supporters of the government, are 
likely to violate the principle of equality. Finally, the principle of equality requires that where 
decisions to prosecute or grant amnesty are individualised, they should be based on clear, 
transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. 
V. AMNESTIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLORING THE ‗GREY AREAS‘ 
IN THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE 
Although international policymakers, scholars, jurists and human rights campaigners 
increasingly proclaim that international law does not permit amnesty laws for serious 
crimes,
56
 to date, no international convention has explicitly prohibited amnesty laws.
57
 
Indeed, ‗on every occasion where an explicit amnesty prohibition or discouragement has been 
mooted in the context of a multilateral treaty negotiation, states have demonstrated a resolute 
unwillingness to agree to even the mildest discouragement‘.58 As a result, discerning whether 
an amnesty law violates international law is a complex task. Firstly, it requires engagement 
with three distinct legal regimes: international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law and international criminal law.
59
 As none of these regimes contains a ‗positive 
articulation‘ of a prohibition of amnesties, this must instead ‗be ―read into‖ a unified 
narrative of what the differentiated regimes collectively require‘.60 This unified approach is 
also required as although international criminal law has developed considerably in the past 
two decades, it remains ‗a legal environment resembling more a patchwork than a coherent, 
let alone complete, system‘, particularly since it covers only a limited number of crimes.61 To 
address these gaps in international criminal law, international human rights law is 
increasingly being relied upon to require States to prosecute serious crimes.
62
 According to 
Seibert-Fohr ‗efforts have been made to refer to this body of law in order not only to interpret 
existing crimes but also to extend the catalogue of international crimes‘.63 According to Bell, 
this process of ‗regime merge‘ began in the 1990s in response to ‗proposed and actual peace 
agreement amnesties‘.64 As a result of this process, declarations made today on prohibitions 
of amnesties for serious human rights violations are derived ‗holistically‘ from these diverse 
legal regimes. However, Bell argues that 
regime merge involved seeing an overall import of the regimes as 
consolidating a ‗tendency‘ or a ‗direction‘ towards accountability that 
nonetheless did not require systematic and complete accountability for all 
crimes committed during the conflict.
65
 
As this section will explore, the resulting position remains somewhat ambiguous but can be 
interpreted as accepting a role for both amnesty and criminal accountability in post-conflict 
transitional justice strategies.
66
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Secondly, the exact relationship of an amnesty law to international law is always 
context specific. For example, it may depend upon the nature of the crimes being amnestied 
as taking part in hostilities may be a crime under domestic law, but it is not an international 
crime that requires prosecution.
67
 In addition, it may depend of the intensity and nature of the 
conflict because, as will be explored below, failures to prosecute may not violate 
international humanitarian law for all forms of conflict. Similarly, amnesties for political 
prisoners or refugees may actually be supported by international law.
68
 Furthermore, whether 
an amnesty breaches international law will depend on the post-conflict States‘ treaty 
commitments, including ‗any valid reservations or interpretive declarations it may have 
made‘, as well as its obligations under customary international law.69 Ultimately, ‗there is the 
possibility that the same conduct may be internationally wrongful so far as one state is 
concerned but not for another state having regard to its own international obligations‘.70 
Finally, within each of the legal regimes the status of amnesty laws is still evolving. 
This process is gradually shaping both the legal regimes themselves and the nature of 
contemporary amnesty laws.
71
 This section will outline the contemporary scope of the duty to 
prosecute under international in law in relation to three categories of crimes: international 
crimes, transnational crimes and serious human rights violations. 
A. International Crimes 
Firstly, and most clearly, the duty to prosecute has been invoked in relation to international 
crimes. According to Cryer these crimes can be distinguished from transnational crimes or 
human rights violations as the ‗locus of the criminal prosecution is the international legal 
order‘,72 rather than domestic law. Currently, there are three widely accepted international 
crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Even within this category of 
crimes there are arguably divergences in the nature of the duty to prosecute. 
For international crimes that are proscribed by international conventions, namely 
genocide
73
 and ‗grave breaches‘ of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I to 
these conventions, relating to international armed conflicts,
74
 the duty to prosecute has been 
described as ‗absolute‘ and as creating a mandatory duty on States to prosecute.75 This 
implies that an amnesty for such crimes would violate a State‘s obligations to prosecute.76 
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However, these conventions may not be applicable in many post-conflict settings due to the 
limitations in their scope. According to the definition of genocide in the Genocide 
Convention, this crime is restricted to actions taken with an ‗intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group‘.77 This definition suggests two limitations. 
First, the requirement of ‗specific intent literally to destroy a substantial portion of the 
population of a target group‘78 does not necessarily apply to many conflict situations. 
Secondly, the omission of acts directed against political groups, means that many situations of 
mass violence, such as South America‘s ‗dirty wars‘, are not included in the scope of the 
Genocide Convention, and hence are excluded from its obligation to prosecute. 
Similarly, the duty to prosecute under the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I applies only to ‗grave breaches‘ committed during international armed conflicts. 
However, since the end of the Second World War, international wars have been rare, and 
today the majority of contemporary wars are internal armed conflicts, for which there is no 
explicit duty to prosecute. Instead, as will be discussed below, Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions, which establishes the international humanitarian law framework for 
non-international armed conflicts encourages States parties to enact ‗the broadest possible 
amnesty‘ at the end of hostilities.79 This Protocol only applies to conflicts that ‗take place in 
the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces 
or other organized armed groups‘, where the rebels are ‗under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of [the state‘s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations‘.80 It does not apply to ‗situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence‘.81 As a result, the duty to 
prosecute war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts, low-intensity conflicts, 
and crimes against humanity committed during conflicts or by repressive regimes, draws 
upon customary international law rather than international conventions.
82
 
Although crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in internal conflicts are 
widely perceived as international offences and have sometimes been prosecuted before 
national and international courts, this does not automatically imply the existence of a 
mandatory duty to prosecute.
83
 Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute 
requires that determinations of whether such a duty exists under customary international law 
must be based on State practice and opinio juris. This can include consideration of the 
existence or absence of relevant domestic legislation (either granting amnesties or requiring 
prosecutions); State practice in relation to mediating peace agreements that include or 
exclude amnesty provisions or to financially and diplomatically support amnesty processes; 
State willingness to include provisions prohibiting amnesty in international conventions; 
voting patterns in UN General Assembly resolutions; or judgements of domestic courts. The 
ICJ Statute also provides that judicial decisions and academic research can be ‗subsidiary‘ 
sources of international custom. At present, some subsidiary sources strongly support the 
existence of the duty to prosecute crimes against humanity and serious violations committed 
in non-international armed conflicts. However, State practice appears much less supportive of 
such a duty. 
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Firstly, in relation to the enactment of amnesty laws, State practice has yet to be 
systematically reviewed. Perhaps the closest effort to do this is the Amnesty Law Database 
created by the author, which collates detailed information on amnesty laws enacted around 
the world since the end of the Second World War, including whether the amnesty included or 
excluded crimes under international law (defined as genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, torture or enforced disappearances). However, this broad survey encompassing over 
520 amnesty laws enacted in 138 countries between 1945 and 2010 has some limitations in 
relation to identifying State practice. Firstly, although the State‘s treaty ratifications at the 
time of the amnesties‘ enactment are considered, the existence of relevant declarations or 
reservations is not. Secondly, identifying whether international crimes were committed can 
be problematic where States seek for political reasons to obfuscate the nature of crimes being 
amnestied by framing them as violations of domestic criminal law, rather than characterizing 
them as crimes under international law (for example, granting amnesty for murder or rape, 
rather than crimes against humanity), or by declining to list the crimes that are amnestied, 
preferring instead to grant amnesty to all political or conflict-related offences committed 
within prescribed dates. Similarly, where a conflict has had considerable international 
dimensions, discerning whether it was an international or internal armed conflict at the time 
the amnestied crimes were committed can be a highly politicised issue. 
Addressing these problems systematically would entail context-specific analyses that 
are beyond the scope of the Amnesty Law Database project in its current form. Instead, in 
constructing the Amnesty Law Database, the author has taken a cautious approach and 
entered data relating to international crimes only when (1) the crimes were explicitly 
mentioned in the text of the amnesty; (2) when case law indicated that the amnesty included 
or excluded crimes under international law; and/or (3) when there is substantial evidence in 
reports by UN or regional human rights institutions or by respected human rights 
organisations, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, that crimes under 
international law were perpetrated. As a result, it is probable that the Amnesty Law Database 
under-represents the number of amnesty processes which grant impunity for crimes under 
international law. Nonetheless, from the data that has been compiled to date it is apparent that 
over the past thirty years, the rate of amnesties including crimes under international law has 
increased, but since the early 1990s, a growing number of amnesties have excluded crimes 
under international law. However, after a peak around 1999, the number of amnesties 
explicitly excluding crimes under international law has fallen, and since the mid-2000s, 
roughly similar numbers of amnesty laws both include and exclude international crimes.
84
 
Secondly, as part of the continued enactment of amnesty laws around the world, some 
States have continued to show themselves to be willing to support peace negotiations in 
which amnesties are agreed.
85
 Although as noted above, the UN changed its position on 
amnesties in conflict mediation at the signing of the Lomé Accord in 1999, there continue to 
be numerous examples, where States and international organizations have supported 
negotiations and peace agreements which offered amnesties to combatants. For example, 
during the final stages of the conflict between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan 
government in 2009, international actors, including the European Parliament, vocally 
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endorsed an amnesty for surrendering insurgents.
86
 These statements of support made no 
reference to the need to prosecute serious human rights violations that had been committed 
during the conflict. In addition to statements of support, some amnesty processes receive 
financial backing. For example, the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000, which granted amnesty for 
all conflict-related crimes committed by insurgents fighting against the government, 
including the atrocities committed by the Lord‘s Resistance Army, has consistently received 
financial support from international donors for its implementation. Most recently, in January 
2008, the Ugandan Amnesty Commission received funding of US$10,055,278 from a World 
Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund to support its work. The donors to this fund included Sate 
parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC) such as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK.
87
 These endorsements of amnesties for serious crimes appear not to 
have been motivated by a desire for impunity, but rather recognition of the role that amnesty 
can play in encouraging combatants to surrender and disarm. Although as yet, no study has 
systemically documented State practice in endorsing or supporting amnesties in third States, 
according to Trumbull, anecdotal evidence suggests that ‗even states that are not affected by 
the crimes do not recognize any law that prohibits affected states from granting amnesty‘.88 
Thirdly, States have consistently failed to prohibit amnesty laws in international 
conventions. For example, during the Rome Conference delegates debated a range of 
proposals relating to amnesty laws, but were ultimately unable to reach a consensus on 
prohibiting them in the ICC Statute. As a result, the Statute contains no reference to amnesty 
legislation.
89
 Indeed, to date, the only convention to discuss amnesty laws explicitly is 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which as noted above, encourages States 
parties to enact the ‗broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated‘ in non-
international armed conflicts.
90
 The Commentary on the Additional Protocol asserts that this 
provision is ‗to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to re-establishing 
normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided‘.91 According to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), this amnesty should only cover ‗combat 
immunity‘, which would ensure that a combatant cannot be punished simply for participating 
in the conflict, ‗including killing enemy combatants, as long as he respected international 
humanitarian law‘.92 This means that, where war crimes were committed, for example, by a 
failure to apply the minimum standards of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the 
ICRC argues it was still intended that the perpetrators would be prosecuted, and that an 
amnesty law would not cover such crimes even during an internal conflict. In its 2005 study 
of customary international humanitarian law, the ICRC argued that its interpretation of article 
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6(5) has become part of customary international law. However, the ICRC study considered 
only a few amnesty laws.
93
 Furthermore, Freeman argues that 
under any approach it is hard to reconcile states‘ refusal to codify an explicit 
prohibition or discouragement of amnesties in the context of multilateral treaty 
negotiations with the purported existence of a custom-based amnesty 
prohibition.
94
 
In contrast to the statements of international and hybrid courts, the trends in State 
practice outlined above have encouraged several commentators to question the prohibition of 
amnesties under customary international law. For example, Cryer states ‗there is not 
sufficient State practice yet to assert that customary law imposes a duty to prosecute all 
international crimes, and certainly not on the basis of universal jurisdiction‘.95 Similarly, 
Trumbull has argued that 
although some countries and various international tribunals have declared that 
amnesties violate customary international law, the large number of amnesties 
granted in the last twenty years—and the participation of third party countries 
in brokering these deal—indicates that the state practice does not support this 
claim.
96
 
As a result, in relation to international crimes regulated by customary international law, 
namely crimes against humanity and war crimes in non-international armed conflicts, it 
appears that the best that can be argued at present is that the duty to prosecute is permissive, 
rather than mandatory. 
B. Transnational Crimes 
Transnational crimes have been described by Cryer as crimes that are prohibited by 
convention, but where the conventions ‗do not, in themselves create direct liability 
international crimes‘.97 Instead, they require State parties to criminalise the crime within 
domestic law. This makes the ‗locus of the criminal prosecution ... the domestic, not the 
international legal order‘.98 In relation to post-conflict peacebuilding, the most relevant 
transnational crimes are torture and enforced disappearances, which are both subject to 
international conventions. However, these conventions contain limitations. Firstly, as noted 
above, in their definitions of the crimes, both conventions state that the offence can only be 
committed ‗by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
                                                          
93
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or other person acting in an official capacity‘.99 This means that torture or enforced 
disappearances committed by non-state actors would not fall within the scope of these 
conventions. 
Secondly, where a State official is accused of torture or enforced disappearances, the 
conventions require States parties to investigate the facts,
100
 and if appropriate, ‗submit the 
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution‘ or extradite the suspect.101 
They further state that domestic authorities shall decide whether to prosecute these offences 
in ‗the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law 
of that State‘.102 This wording is more ambiguous than the explicit obligations outlined in the 
Genocide Convention or the Geneva Conventions. Consequently, it has caused many 
commentators to argue that there is a degree of permissiveness regarding the manner in which 
a State must carry out its duties under these conventions, as they do ‗not explicitly require a 
prosecution to take place, let alone that punishment be imposed and served‘.103 It seems, 
instead, to leave the decision on whether to prosecute alleged torturers or persons responsible 
for disappearances to the discretion of the prosecutorial authorities. 
Finally, the Convention on Enforced Disappearance allows States parties to establish 
‗mitigating circumstances‘ for persons 
who, having been implicated in the commission of an enforced disappearance, 
who effectively contribute to bringing the disappeared person forward alive or 
make it possible to clarify cases of enforced disappearance or to identify the 
perpetrators of an enforced disappearance.
104
 
According to McCrory, ‗depending on the precise operation of national law‘, such mitigating 
circumstances can ‗impact on the penalty imposed‘, by reducing or removing it.105 In this 
way, the convention provides for leniency for offenders who disclose truth about 
disappearances. Such disclosures could serve some of the objectives of prosecutions, such as 
uncovering the facts, attributing responsibility, providing some form of reparations and 
acknowledgement to victims, and communicating public repudiation of the crimes. 
C. Human Rights Law 
International and regional human rights conventions set out a wide range of human rights 
protections. However, only the most serious violations of these rights are argued to create a 
duty to investigate or prosecute perpetrators, and this duty is not explicitly mentioned in any 
of the conventions. Although no exact list of which human rights violations trigger these 
obligations exists, the UN has adopted the phrase ‗gross violations of human rights‘ to 
describe these rights and it stipulates that this category includes ‗torture and similar cruel, 
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inhuman or degrading treatment; extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions; slavery; 
enforced disappearances; and rape and other forms of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity‘.106 The UN has stated that it will not ‗endorse provisions in peace agreements that 
include amnesties‘ for these violations.107 Where amnesties for serious violations have been 
challenged before the human rights treaty monitoring bodies the cases differ from the 
application of international criminal law, as the cases do not focus on prosecuting individual 
offenders. Instead, the human rights institutions are asked to consider whether by enacting 
amnesty legislation, a State has violated its international obligations, particularly the duties to 
provide a remedy, to investigate, to prosecute and punish, and to repair harm.
108
 This is 
possible even where the amnesty is valid under national law. 
Several human rights treaty monitoring bodies have produced judgements and 
opinions on the extent to which amnesty laws have violated a State‘s obligations under their 
constituent treaties. However, due to limitations of space, the analysis of the decisions of 
these bodies will focus only the human rights institutions with binding jurisdiction that have 
issued judgements on this issue, namely the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights.
109
 
Of these two institutions, the Inter-American Court has been more active in deciding 
whether amnesty laws violate the rights protected in the American Convention on Human 
Rights. The first amnesty decision to come before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
related to two amnesty laws enacted in Peru in 1995 under President Fujimori.
110
 These self-
amnesty laws offered broad immunity to persons who had committed human rights violations 
on behalf of the State and their enactment prevented legal proceedings to investigate and 
prosecute massacres. This caused the Peruvian National Human Rights Coordinating 
Committee to bring the Barrios Altos case to the Inter-American system in 1995.
111
 The 
Inter-American Court issued its ruling in this case in 2001, in which it stated that with respect 
to the amnesty laws, 
all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of 
measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they 
are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible 
for serious human rights violations...
112
 
As a result, the Court found that both Peruvian self-amnesty laws were manifestly 
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and consequently, lacked 
legal effect and may not continue to obstruct the investigation of the grounds 
on which this case is based or the identification and punishment of those 
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responsible, nor can they have the same or a similar impact with regard to 
other cases that have occurred in Peru, where the rights established in the 
American Convention have been violated.
113
 
The Court then called on the State to ‗investigate the facts to determine the identity of those 
responsible for the human rights violations referred to in this judgment, and also publish the 
results of this investigation and punish those responsible‘.114 This was the first judgement in 
which an international court ‗declared a national law invalid‘.115 
The second case relating to amnesty laws to come before the Inter-American Court 
was Almonacid-Arellano v Chile. This case concerned the 1973 extrajudicial execution of 
Luis Almonacid-Arellano, which could not be investigated in Chile due to the 1978 amnesty 
law.
116
 The plaintiffs then took their case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
where their complaints focused on the denial of justice after 1990, when Chile accepted the 
Court‘s jurisdiction. In its judgement, the Court surveyed developments in international 
criminal law since the early 1990s, such as the jurisprudence of the ad hoc and hybrid 
tribunals and it determined that 
The States cannot neglect their duty to investigate, identify, and punish those 
persons responsible for crimes against humanity by enforcing amnesty laws or 
any other similar domestic provisions. Consequently, crimes against humanity 
are crimes which cannot be susceptible of amnesty.
117
 
The Court further argued that the continued application of the amnesty law after Chile had 
ratified the Convention and accepted the court‘s jurisdiction is ‗overtly incompatible with the 
wording and the spirit of the American Convention, and undoubtedly affects the rights 
embodied in such Convention‘. It found that ‗this constitutes in and of itself a violation of the 
Convention and generates international liability for the State‘.118 On this basis, the Court 
found that Chile‘s 1978 amnesty law 
does not have any legal effects and cannot remain as an obstacle for the 
investigation of the facts inherent to the instant case, or for the identification 
and punishment of those responsible therefore. Neither can it have a like or 
similar impact regarding other cases of violations of rights protected by the 
American Convention which occurred in Chile.
119
 
This finding mirrors the Court‘s ruling in the Barrios Altos case that Peru‘s amnesty laws 
were without legal effect. These findings were reiterated in 2010 Gomes Lund et al. 
(‘Guerrilha do Araguaia’) v Brazil, in which the Inter-American Court analysed the 
compatibility of Brazil‘s 1979 amnesty law120 with the American Convention on Human 
Rights. In this case, the Court  
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concluded that the provisions of the Amnesty Law that prevent the 
investigation and punishment of serious human rights violations are 
incompatible with the American Convention and lack legal effect, and as such, 
cannot continue to represent an obstacle for the investigation of the facts of the 
case or for the identification and punishment of those responsible.
121
 
More recently, in February 2011, the Inter-American Court in the Gelman v Uruguay case 
considered Uruguay‘s 1986 amnesty law which granted immunity for serious human rights 
violations committed by State officials.
122
 It found that even though official reinterpretations 
of this law from 2005 meant that it was no longer an obstacle to investigations and 
prosecutions in the present case,
123
 the State‘s failure to adapt its domestic law to confirm 
with the convention represented a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
124
 The Court 
therefore held that ‗the state must ensure that it never again be an obstacle to the investigation 
of the facts of the case or the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those 
responsible for these and other grave human rights violations‘.125 
These judgements illustrate that the Inter-American Court has taken a strong position 
on both amnesties and the need to punish serious human rights violations. However, whilst 
clearly stating that self-amnesties prevent thorough investigations of the facts and punishment 
of the individuals responsible, thereby violating the American Convention, these judgments 
did not stipulate what form of punishment is appropriate. The court, however, provided 
clearer guidance in the 2007 judgment in the La Rochela Massacre case, where it discussed 
Colombia‘s Justice and Peace Law.126 In this judgment, the court found that a punishment or 
sanction must be proportional to the harm suffered.
127
 It referred to previous case law to 
explain that, for punishment to be proportional, it must address the harm suffered and the 
culpability with which the author acted.
128
 The court further added that the penalty must be 
‗issued by a judicial authority‘.129 This formulation ties punishment to criminal proceedings. 
It does not address, however, whether all perpetrators must be subjected to prosecutions, or 
whether the State will be viewed as fulfilling its obligations if only those deemed most 
responsible for the policies of repression or individuals who committed the most notorious 
crimes are put on trial. 
Unlike its Inter-American counterpart, the European Court of Human Rights has not 
any direct experience of dealing with amnesty laws. Furthermore, where it has been 
confronted with cases where serious human rights violations had been committed, the court 
has declined to proclaim an ‗outright duty to punish‘. Instead, it has found that States are 
under an obligation to conduct ‗investigations capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible‘.130 The reference to prosecutions here seems to denote the 
quality of the investigations, rather than a requirement that prosecutions be conducted. With 
regards to amnesties, it indicates that where amnesty laws prevent investigations they would 
violate Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Amnesties that coexist with 
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or incentivize truth recovery may remain possible under this approach. However, the Court 
has cautioned that amnesty or impunity for State agents could undermine public confidence 
in the rule of law.
131
 For example, in the 2006 Abdülsamet Yaman v Turkey case which 
involved allegations of article 3 violations concerning torture against a 12-year old boy by the 
Turkish police, the Court stated in relation to a hypothetical amnesty that it 
reaffirms that when an agent of the State is accused of crimes that violate 
Article 3, the criminal proceedings and sentencing must not be time-barred 
and the granting of an amnesty or pardon should not be permissible.
132
 
This statement did not relate to a transitional context wherein amnesty was being considered 
as part of a broader process of national reconciliation. This distinction is significant because, 
as Seibert-Fohr notes, ‗the call for criminal measures in ordinary cases should not be taken as 
evidence for an uncompromised formula which applies equally in exceptional 
circumstances‘.133 However, given the court‘s strong statement on the duty to investigate, it 
seems likely that amnesties that prevent any form of truth-recovery would be in violation of 
the treaty provisions. 
Overall, it seems that within international human rights law, the most strident 
opposition to national amnesty laws has come from the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. However, Cryer notes that ‗it is by no means clear that this is reflective of a more 
general principle of human rights law, and probably has much to do with the particular 
context of Latin America‘, and the fact that the amnesty laws under consideration were self-
amnesties granted by repressive regimes.
134
 Other human rights institutions, such as the UN‘s 
Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights ‗have not gone so far as 
the Inter-American Court‘, which casts doubt on the extent to which a universal prohibition 
of amnesty laws has become part of international human rights law.
135
 
IV. PREVENTING IMPUNITY 
Within transitional justice literature, prosecutions for serious human rights violations are 
often advocated on political as well as legal grounds. These arguments typically suggest that 
an absence of prosecutions will create or reinforce a climate of impunity, and thereby 
undermine the rule of law.
136
 Here, impunity is understood in accordance with the UN‘s 
Updated Set of Principles to Combat Impunity as ‗the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of 
bringing the perpetrators of violations to account—whether in criminal, civil, administrative 
or disciplinary proceedings‘.137 The principles continue that both judicial and non-judicial 
proceedings should lead to perpetrators of serious crimes under international law ‗being 
accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making 
reparations to their victims‘.138 Under this approach, holding perpetrators to account is 
viewed as synonymous with criminal trials, and failures by States to investigate violations 
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and to ensure that ‗those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly 
punished‘ by for example enacting amnesty laws are perceived as resulting in impunity.139 
For anti-impunity campaigners, failing to prosecute serious human rights violations 
holds many dangers for post-conflict States. For example, where the laws are not enforced, it 
may ‗vitiate the authority of law itself, sapping its power to deter proscribed conduct‘.140 
Under such circumstances, individuals may believe ‗that they can ―get away‖ with 
violence‘.141 This situation would arguably encourage former perpetrators to continue their 
behaviour or new offenders to engage in violent crimes in the post-conflict period. 
Furthermore, under a climate of impunity, cultures of violence and corruption may endure 
due to the absence of prosecutions to communicate the norms and values that repudiate past 
crimes.
142 This might in turn ‗undermine the establishment of democratic institutions‘.143 In 
contrast, it is argued that prosecutions for past crimes might ‗may assuage the community‘s 
fears and provide a sense of stability and security for the new democratic regime‘.144 
While these goals are of course laudable, in many post-conflict States, there are 
reasons to doubt whether omitting amnesty from a peace deal will eliminate impunity. 
Indeed, as will be explored below, where thousands of individuals have been engaged in 
violence and criminality during conflict, post-conflict States frequently face an ‗impunity 
gap‘ where the national legal system does not have the capacity to try all the perpetrators and 
may face political constraints to widespread trials.
145
 Furthermore, Fletcher and Weinstein 
argue that the focus on individual criminal responsibility for ordering and carrying out mass 
violence  
leaves three categories of persons and groups largely untouched: (1) 
unindicted perpetrators including community members who directly or 
indirectly profited from the event; (2) states outside the area of conflict that 
may have contributed to the outbreak of violence by their acts or omissions; 
and, (3) the bystanders who did not actively participate in violence, but who 
also did not actively intervene to stop the horrors.
146
 
Furthermore, Leebaw argues that the ‗extraordinary, temporary‘ nature of transitional justice 
institutions ‗places them in tension with core principles associated with rule of law‘.147 She 
contends that this tension can arise where pragmatic compromises are made that ‗narrow the 
scope and efficiency of transitional justice‘.148 Such compromises could entail limiting the 
temporal jurisdiction of international or hybrid courts to narrowly specified periods or a 
restricted number of crimes. Furthermore, where prosecutions are carried out, ‗lenient 
sentences, plea bargaining, and the refusal or inability to attain custody of key suspects can 
undermine‘ the courts‘ ability to communicate the rule of law to the populace.149 However, of 
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course, making such compromises may be an unavoidable outcome of the post-conflict 
situation. Where amnesties are granted as part of a political compromise, their impact on 
impunity may vary depending on the scope and effects of the law, and the relationship of the 
amnesty to trials or other accountability mechanisms. 
A. Limited Prosecutions and Limited Amnesties 
As noted above, amnesty laws can be designed to complement criminal justice strategies in 
diverse ways. Where enacted, such amnesties shield some specified offences, or offenders 
from prosecution, but would permit other prosecutions to proceed. Although this foreclosing 
of the possibility of prosecutions for some crimes might be seen as breach of the duty to 
prosecute, in fact it seems highly unlikely that international or domestic law would require 
post-conflict States to prosecute all offences. Indeed, as Teitel notes ‗even in ordinary times, 
the rule of law is not predicated on fully enforced criminal justice, and the reasons for 
forbearance are often, as in transitional times, political‘.150 Although there are differences 
between common law and civil law systems in the extent to which the principle of legality 
anticipates the law to be enforced, under both systems, many crimes will never be 
prosecuted.
151
 For example, McEvoy highlights that within the United Kingdom, only 
‗approximately 3-4 per of crimes result in a successful prosecution‘, a figure which he states 
is ‗fairly typical for most advanced industrial societies‘.152 Based on this he argues that ‗even 
in the unlikely event‘ that the justice systems of post-conflict States could ‗eventually be 
―raised‖ to the performance levels of their Western counterparts, they would still most likely 
fall far short of the mark‘.153 
Given the exceptional conditions faced by post-conflict States, it seems unlikely that 
they will be able to prosecute all past crimes, or even all ordinary crimes committed in the 
post-conflict period. As noted above, this was acknowledged by the UN Secretary-General in 
his report on Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law,
154
 in which he suggested that to 
address the ‗impunity gap‘ prosecutors should develop prosecutorial policies that are 
‗strategic, based on clear criteria, and take account of the social context‘ and by introducing 
‗an effective communications strategy‘ to manage public expectations.155 A preference for 
selectivity in prosecutions has also been expressed by Orentlicher who argued that ‗the 
demands of justice and political stability are best reconciled through a program of 
prosecutions that has defined limits‘.156 To date, these prosecutorial strategies both at national 
and hybrid courts have generally focused on investigating and trying certain offences, such as 
those committed by the political and military elites, crimes under international law, or 
representative selections of crimes that will bring to light the patterns of victimisation that 
affected the different communities within the State. 
The acceptance of amnesty laws as part of selective prosecution strategies has been 
described by Pensky as a ‗sub-principle‘ of anti-impunity norm.157 He argues that it 
recognizes that this norm has to be integrated into broader post-conflict peacebuilding 
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programmes that include disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration measures.
158
 Where 
amnesties coexist with prosecutions, rather than failing to bring those who are beyond at the 
scope of the limited prosecution strategy into a legal process, amnesties can facilitate their 
reintegration into society and law-abidance. Such amnesty laws could be limited to allow 
prosecutors to focus on investigating specific individuals, such as high-ranking military or 
political leaders, or members of armed factions who have not signed up to a peace agreement. 
Alternatively, amnesties laws could be limited by specifying that amnesty can only be 
granted for an explicit list of offences or that serious human rights violations are exempted 
from the amnesty. Furthermore, conditions could be attached to amnesty laws that would 
withdraw grants of amnesty for offenders who failed to engage fully with peacebuilding 
processes, by for example, refusing to participate in alternative accountability mechanisms or 
returning to violence. By reinstating the possibility of prosecution, such conditional 
amnesties could mirror the supposed deterrent effects of trials. 
In this way, the amnesty laws could provide a ‗filter‘ mechanism allowing prosecutors 
to direct their often limited resources towards prioritising offenders who are the least willing 
to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. Furthermore, although at first glance, 
amnesty laws seem to be antithesis of retributive justice as they are designed to shield 
offenders from legal punishments, they could arguably be designed to facilitate some 
prosecutions. For example, where amnesty or other leniency measures result in admissions of 
guilt or offenders testifying against their former superiors, they could contribute to the goals 
of retribution by speeding up complex trials and facilitating the gathering of evidence to 
prosecute those who are ‗most responsible‘ or least repentant. Furthermore, by delivering 
exemplary prosecutions, rather than blanket amnesties, such combined processes can still 
‗vindicate the authority of the law‘ and communicate public norms to repudiate human rights 
violations.
159
 However, for this to be successfully achieved it is important that the 
prosecution strategy adhere to rule of law standards relating to the principle of equality and 
due process. It also essential that the limitations in the scope of the amnesty are not merely 
rhetorical, but that prosecutions where they remain possible are pursued. 
B. Amnesties as Delivering Accountability 
Although transitional justice literature frequently equates accountability with criminal 
prosecutions, the term is understood more broadly in other disciplines to encompass measures 
that require offenders to (1) answer for their crimes by outlining the facts and explaining or 
justifying their decisions, to have this testimony scrutinised and recorded; and (2) to submit 
to enforcement mechanisms.
160
 Although both answerability and enforcement are elements of 
criminal justice processes, in general, the punitive nature of trials may cause offenders to lie, 
obfuscate or conceal the full extent of their crimes.
161
 In this way, enforcement may be 
privileged over answerability. 
In contrast, although amnesties impede some criminal enforcement mechanisms, 
recent amnesty laws in several jurisdictions have been designed to promote the answerability. 
For example, where amnesties are conditional on offenders disclosing and explaining their 
crimes in public hearings, such as before truth commissions or in restorative justice 
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processes, this can be viewed as a form of enforcement as such public confessions can cause 
offenders to feel shame and can damage their public reputations.
162
 For example, in his 
consideration of the South African amnesty processes as an accountability mechanism, Slye 
argued that ‗[a]mnesty does not come cheap‘ for the perpetrators as they face considerable 
public, personal and professional repercussions, and that ‗[p]ublic shame, personal alienation 
and familial rejection should not be dismissed as insignificant‘.163 Alternatively, amnesties 
can enforce accountability by encouraging compliance with vetting programmes that remove 
specific individuals from public office, particularly from the police or armed forces. Vetting 
can deliver enforcement through loss of status, loss of livelihood and in some cases loss of 
pension or other financial benefits.
164
 In other instances, leniency from prosecution has been 
incumbent of offenders contributing materially or symbolically to reparations programmes. 
According to Trumbull, incorporating accountability measures into an amnesty can send ‗the 
message that the country condemns the acts, even if it does not prosecute‘.165 
Where amnesty laws are individualised and conditioned upon offenders participating 
in transitional justice and peacebuilding processes, they can help to serve some of the goals of 
these processes, plus also delivering some of the rationales of punishment. Where 
accountable forms of amnesty are coupled with trials, they can work to bring those who were 
previously outside the law into the new transitional constitutional framework and discourses 
on national reconciliation. In this way, amnesty laws can be viewed not as an end unto 
themselves, but rather as a bridging mechanism that can facilitate other goals of transitional 
justice projects and prevent impunity developing. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In keeping with the ATLAS project objectives, this section will offer recommendations on 
how the European Union (EU) should approach amnesty laws in order to promote human 
rights and international humanitarian law after armed conflicts. To date, although the EU 
institutions have acknowledged a role for transitional justice and the rule of law 
programmes,
166
 and have made funding available to support such initiatives,
167
 they have yet 
to develop a central statement of EU policy for all three of the core international crimes: 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
168
 Furthermore, the practice of EU 
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institutions and Member States towards amnesties within peacebuilding programmes is 
inconsistent.
169
 For example, although all EU Member States have ratified the Rome Statute 
of the ICC, several Member States have been willing to contribute financially to the work of 
the Ugandan Amnesty Commission despite the ICC arrest warrants issued for the leaders of 
the Lord‘s Resistance Army. Furthermore, the EU is financially supporting the Justice and 
Peace Law in Colombia under which right-wing paramilitaries are being disarmed,
170
 and 
through its role in the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the EU monitored the reintegration of 
amnestied former combatants and ruled on disputed amnesty cases.
171
 In both Colombia and 
Aceh, serious human rights violators were able to benefit from leniency in relation to legal 
sanctions. Furthermore, as noted above, during the final stages of the conflict between the 
Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government in 2009, international actors, including the 
European Parliament, vocally endorsed an amnesty for surrendering insurgents.
172
 These 
statements of support made no reference to the need to prosecute serious human rights 
violations that had been committed during the conflict. Finally, several EU Member States 
have amnesty legislation that prevents prosecutions into human rights violations committed 
in the past, for example, the amnesty laws enacted in Spain in the 1970s following the death 
of General Franco, and the series of amnesties enacted in France following the Evian Accords 
which granted independence to Algeria. 
The inconsistent approach of the EU institutions and Member States seems in keeping 
with the unsettled status of amnesties under international law as outlined above, namely that 
international law requires some accountability for serious human rights violations, but still 
acknowledges a role for amnesties to encourage combatants to participate in peacebuilding 
measures. Consequently, the challenge for the EU in developing a coherent approach to 
amnesty laws is to balance the need for amnesty with efforts to promote the rule of law and 
hold serious offenders accountable for their crimes. Based on the arguments outlined in this 
paper and the experiences of amnesty laws to date, the author notes that amnesties can play a 
positive role in conflict transformation, and therefore recommends that the EU should not 
pursue an automatic prohibition of amnesties. However, neither should it support automatic, 
unconditional amnesties or self-amnesties enacted by repressive regimes. Instead, the EU 
should support amnesties only where they are necessary components of broader 
peacebuilding projects and where they meet certain conditions. These conditions can include 
requirements that amnesties be part of wider reform measures, such as measures to introduce 
democratic rule, promote reconciliation and promote stability in the post-conflict State by 
encouraging combatants to surrender. Furthermore, amnesties should not represent impunity, 
but rather should be designed to complement prosecution strategies or non-judicial 
accountability mechanisms, such as truth commissions, restorative justice processes, vetting 
and reparations programmes. In addition, where amnesty laws are adopted, they must confirm 
to domestic rule of law requirements, particularly the principle of equality and procedural 
rules on amnesty enactment, and as far as possible, deliberations on amnesty legislation 
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should be public and participative. Where amnesties adhere to these requirements, the EU 
should work to make them more effective by providing financial resources to amnesty and 
DDR programmes; supporting the training and empowerment local civil society groups to 
sensitise local communities and facilitate the reintegration of combatants; and where 
amnesties are designed to complement prosecution strategies, supporting the rule of law 
reforms that are required to ensure that prosecutions can take place. 
